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Abstract 
In 2012, China’s gross domestic product rose 7.8%, industrial value added advanced 10% and 
the consumer price index climbed 2.6%. The Chinese economy first declined and then 
bounced back up in the year. As a result, most experts and institutes are optimistic and even 
unduly upbeat about economic growth in 2013, expecting an 8.5% or even a 9.3% growth 
rate. However, such a high rate of growth is not supported by the demands of economic 
transformation and restructuring, growth potential, policy operating room or the international 
environment. Therefore, a 7.0 to 8.0% growth rate will be more reasonable. To achieve the 
goals of advancing new urbanization, doubling people’s incomes, moving forward with the 
‘Build a Beautiful China’ campaign and proceeding with political reforms that were adopted 
at the 18th Chinese Communist Party National Congress, economic restructuring and 
re-balancing efforts must be intensified to allow for sustainability. 
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1. Overall Assessment of the Economy 
In 2012, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) totalled RMB 51.9 trillion, up 7.8% from the 
previous year, which was slightly higher than the 7.5% target set by the government at the 
beginning of the year. The consumer price index (CPI) rose 2.6%, within the control target set 
by the government, which was something of a triumph. However, given the declining growth 
potential and economic deceleration, jubilance may not be justifiable.  
 
Figure 1: GDP, Industrial Value Added and CPI Growth Trends 
 
 
 Among the three economic drivers, investment in fixed assets (excluding rural 
households) reached RMB 36.4835 trillion in 2012, which represented a nominal growth of 
20.6% over the previous year (up 19.3% on an inflation-adjusted basis) and a year-on-year 
decline of 3.4 percentage points in the growth rate. Total retail sales of consumer goods 
reached RMB 20.7167 trillion, a nominal growth of 14.3% (up 12.1% on an 
inflation-adjusted basis) and a drop of 2.8 percentage points in the growth rate over 2011. 
Imports and exports totalled US$ 3.86676 trillion, which represented a 6.2% rise and a 
decline of 16.3 percentage points in the growth rate on a year-on-year basis. Aggregated 
exports were US$ 2.04893 trillion, up 7.9%; imports reached US$ 1.81783 trillion, up 4.3%. 
The trade surplus amounted to US$ 231.1 billion in the year.  
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 In the respective four quarters, the economy grew at 8.1%, 7.6%, 7.4% and 7.9%, 
descending first and then climbing up over the year as a result of many stabilizing policies. 
Whether these figures indicate that the whole economy has recovered and embarked on a new 
trajectory of growth remains to be seen, because the economic environment and growth 
foundation are not fundamentally improved or solidified. But optimistic predictions of 
economic operation in 2013 are very common. Some predictions for the operation of the 
economy for 2013 are summarized in Table 1. 
The analysis of Renmin University of China only takes into account some short-term 
positive factors, but ignores the fundamental restraining factors and forces. Therefore, it is 
unduly optimistic. The analysis of the National Academy of Economic Strategy of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences CASS considers the positive and negative factors. But it 
is contradictory in some aspects. On the one hand, it foresees an economic acceleration and 
declining inflation. On the other hand, it predicts a slowdown in global economic recovery 
and a rapid growth in exports. So it is also quite optimistic. So are the predictions of most 
other institutions. Some think that the predictions of the project team of the Development 
Research Center of the State Council are too conservative. But in fact, a concrete and 
high-quality 7.5% growth rate may be something we would jump at. 
 Such analyses and predictions will pose a certain impact on China’s choice of economic 
policies and real economic operation. Therefore, they need to be further discussed.  
From the perspective of demand, major problems hampering China’s economic operation 
and growth include structural imbalance, institutional distortion, improper growth patterns 
and declining efficiency, which threaten long-term sustainability rather than short-term 
growth. To address these problems, we should avoid push too hard only for a high growth 
rate. Therefore, we need to compromise some time and speed for more room and 
opportunities to adjust and re-balance the economy. These are inevitable requirements in 
economic operation and growth, and also valuable experiences that come at a huge cost. If 
the growth rate is up to 8.5% or even 9.0%, there won’t be much room for economic 
restructuring and re-balancing. Some scholars have more zeal for a high growth rate than 
government officials and industry insiders. 
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Table 1: Some Predictions for the 2013 Economy 
Institution Major Points 
 
Predictions for 2013 
 
 
Renmin University of 
China 
 
The economy bounced back from 
the bottom in September of 2012. 
In 2013, it will return to the path of 
recovery, cross the ‘new normal’ 
state and enter an era of 
sub-high-speed growth.  
 
The GDP will grow 9.3%, 
retail sales of consumer goods 
16.1%, investment 24.3%, 
exports 14.2% and CPI 4.2%. 
 
National Academy of 
Economic Strategy of 
Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences 
(CASS) 
 
 
 
Chinese economy won’t pick up 
within a short period. It is just 
building up the force for recovery 
and will slowly go up amid 
fluctuations. 
 
The GDP will grow 8.5%, 
retail sales of consumer goods 
15.5%, investment 22.5%, 
exports 14% and CPI 2.4%. 
IMF, World Bank, 
Asian Development 
Bank, CASS, Yellow 
Book and Blue Book 
 The GDP will grow 8.0-8.5%. 
 
Development 
Research Center of 
the State Council 
 
The earlier competitive advantages 
and growth dynamics of the 
Chinese economy have gradually 
declined. New advantages have yet 
to take shape. Market confidence 
and predictions are not stable. In 
view of the economic growth stage 
and uncertainties, we should create 
conditions for maintaining 
economic stability while looking 
for new balance, and carrying out 
economic system reform and 
restructuring.  
 
The GDP will gain 7.5% and 
the CPI 4%. 
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 In terms of growth, China’s economic growth potential has dramatically declined and the 
period of low-cost growth has come to an end. The 9.3% predicted actual growth rate 
indicates that China’s potential growth rate should be over 9.5%. Otherwise, the economy 
would be overheated. The 8.5% actual growth rate is based on a potential growth rate of 
around 9.0%. But where does the growth potential come from? Over the past two decades, 
more than 500 million labourers have been transferred from rural areas and more will be 
transferred in the future. Most have been young. In 2012, the working age population was 
reduced by 3.45 million, pointing to demographic issues for the future. Currently, China still 
registers a high rate of savings, which stands at 51%. But the structure is quite imbalanced. 
Businesses and government account for 60% of the savings, and individuals only 40%. Five 
per cent of the richest families contribute 61.6% of the personal savings. Also, the 
hard-earned savings are not well utilized. The large foreign exchange reserve indicates that a 
large proportion of the savings are used for foreign trade. Moreover, many large investments 
in China demonstrate low utilization efficiency. Although China has entered a ‘high-speed 
railway’ era, many high-speed railways suffer huge losses. Recovering the huge investments 
and repaying the capital and interest pose daunting challenges. To make things worse, costs 
are climbing at a significant rate. Labour costs, land prices and environmental costs are on the 
rise. To maintain an 8.5% or even a 9.0% growth rate, we must sacrifice the environment and 
even people’s health. Take the construction of railways as an example. Last year, nine railway 
projects failed to pass the environmental impact assessment. However, to maintain the growth 
rate, no project was completely shut down due to failure to pass the assessment. The reality is 
that ‘the Ministry of Environmental Protection can do nothing even if some key projects are 
not in compliance with environmental protection regulations’. Also, the environmental impact 
assessment needs to make way for some projects under the authority of local government 
officials. Most railway projects are national key projects.  
 Nor is such a high economic growth rate supported by the international environment. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2013 will remain a gloomy economic 
year around the world. The IMF has also adjusted its global economic growth rate predictions 
down to 3.5%, as well as the growth rates of the US (to 2%), Europe (0.2%) and Japan 
(1.2%). The world economy is still in the post-crisis adjustment period; the restructuring is 
not yet completed. Deflation leads to sluggish demand growth and the crisis tends to be 
extended. Moreover, as a result of renminbi appreciation, rising export costs and exacerbating 
trade frictions, China’s exports grew only 6.7% last year. How can the growth rate be doubled 
to over 14% this year? It would be a great achievement if the rate could be raised to 10%.  
 On a macro level, there is not much operating room for monetary policies. This has been 
proven by the long-term mass counter purchase. Also, rising inflation makes new adjustments 
necessary. Although there is much room for fiscal policies, tax reduction won’t be too 
vigorous despite deficit expansion. How will such a high growth rate be achieved? 
 In view of this, a prediction of a 7.0 to 8.0% growth rate would be more appropriate. It is 
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more reasonable to set the growth target around 7.5% this year. On this basis, the following 
predictions are made (Table 2): 
 
Table 2: Actual and Projected Growth, 2012-2013 
      Quarter 
 
Economic 
Indicators 
2012  
(Actual) 
Q4 of 2012 
(Actual) 
Q1 of 2013 
(Predicted) 
2013 
(Predicted) 
Growth (%) Growth (%) Growth (%) Growth (%) 
GDP 7.8 7.9 7.4 7.6 
Industrial value 
added 
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.5 
Investment in 
fixed assets 
20.6 20.7 20.0 20.4 
Retail sales of 
consumer goods 
14.3 14.4 14.5 14. 6 
Exports 7.9 14.1* 7.5 8.0 
Imports 4.3 6.0* 5.5 7 
CPI 2.6 2.5* 2.5 3.2 
 
Notes: 1. The growth rates of GDP and industrial value added are calculated at comparable 
prices. Other indexes are calculated at current prices; 2. The investment in fixed assets refers 
to total investment in fixed assets; 3. Industrial value added refers to the value added of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs whose annual sales revenues are over RMB 5 
million; 4. Data marked with * is December data. 
 
2. Advancing New Urbanization 
The report to the 18th CCP National Congress contained some necessary old ideas, and also 
some new concepts, such as advancing new urbanization,1 doubling people’s incomes and 
‘Build a Beautiful China’,2 which will be discussed in the following sections.  
 Urbanization constitutes an innate driver for China’s economic sustainability, because it 
is a process in which resources are redistributed from low-efficiency sectors to 
                                                        
1 ‘New urbanization’ is a term coined by Premier Li Keqiang, addressing necessary reforms of the 
household registration system and as strategy to increase income and transition to growth driven by 
consumption. 
2 ‘Build a Beautiful China’ is a campaign launched at the 18th CCP Congress in November 2012, and 
encompasses economic, political and environmental reforms to create a more sustainable development of 
China. 
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high-efficiency ones, the economic structure is optimized and people’s incomes are increased. 
It can bring about large-scale infrastructure development and investment in fixed assets, 
absorb the surplus capacity resulting from industrialization, release consumption potential 
and boost economic growth. That is why the 18th CCP National Congress proposed to 
advance ‘new urbanization’.  
 In 2011, China’s urbanization rate reached 51.27%. However, calculated by the number 
of registered households, the rate only stood at around 35%, far below the 70-80% 
urbanization rates of developed countries. China’s urbanization drive remains incomplete. 
Although coastal areas and major cities are well modernized, the vast inland and urban areas 
are lagging far behind, and are even sluggish. Taking a look at the rural areas outside Beijing, 
we may gain a new perspective on China’s actual conditions, as what we see there is totally 
different from what we see from our offices.  
 There are two major obstacles to urbanization: the household registration system (Hukou) 
and the land system. After more than 30 years of reform and opening up, the household 
registration system still cannot be abolished. It is embarrassing to talk about a market 
economy, democracy and freedom when we have a household registration system that divides 
urban and rural areas, giving rise to a mass population flow in China. The 500 million urban 
dwellers that choose to work in urban areas still retain their old mindsets, ways of living and 
consumption habits, making them farmers living in urban areas. They are working-age 
labourers who don’t feel an attachment to urban areas or have long-term plans. In the rural 
areas the old and weak and women and children remain, symbolizing the decline of the rural 
areas. It is because of this that the division between urban and rural areas has moved into 
cities, where rich urban residents lead a life of luxury, while migrant workers live in dark, wet 
basements, in dirty and shabby villages within cities. The children of urban residents can go 
to well-equipped and well-staffed public schools while children of migrant workers have only 
inadequate schools that may be shut down at any time. On the one hand, resource distribution 
is optimized. On the other hand, the waste of resources is increased. Consequently, the 
positive energy of urbanization is not brought into full play. 
 While it seems that the household registration system is just a piece of paper, hidden 
behind it are many social benefits, including education, healthcare, housing, employment and 
care for the elderly. So the household registration system indicates a society of status 
characterized by privileges and discrimination. This has ‘eaten into people’s bones’, such that 
that dozens of Beijing residents signed a petition against the reform to allow children of 
migrant workers to take college entrance examinations in cities where they live. People are  
discriminated against by their household registration status, which leaves people with rural 
registration with fewer rights compared to urban residents. On the one hand, people are 
against the privileges of others. On the other hand, they want to retain their own privileges, 
and want even more. They are discontent with discrimination against themselves, but at the 
same time, they discriminate against others.  
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Therefore, to properly advance urbanization, we should first abolish the household 
registration system and the social benefits associated with it. This is totally attainable given 
human, material and financial resources. For instance, we can provide compulsory education 
for both the children of migrant workers and those of urban residents, allow students to take 
national college entrance examinations in cities where they live, and provide unified medical 
care in both urban and rural areas. However, we would rather spend a huge amount of money 
building high-class office buildings and hotels and helping many African countries build 
large theatres and stadiums, than spend money on our own children. The progress that has 
been made in recent years should be acknowledged. But it is not enough. This is the 
government’s responsibility, so there is nothing to boast about. 
 In terms of land ownership, the system is characterized by a dual system that is the 
primary obstacle to sound urban development. Therefore, addressing the land issue is key to 
urbanization. There are differences in land rights in urban and rural areas, in state-owned and 
collectively-owned land, and in land for construction and farming purposes. The combination 
of government control over land use and government monopoly of the primary land market 
renders urbanization a process in which the government forcibly converts farmland and urban 
areas consume rural areas. If this problem is not fundamentally solved, further distortion will 
be unavoidable in new urbanization. However, to date, the government has not come up with 
such a plan.  
 According to some media reports, the Ministry of Land and Resources is preparing new 
regulations on available land to increase the supply of land for urbanization and to stabilize 
land prices. According to the plan under deliberation, all the land lots except those designated 
for commercial buildings and other business-oriented property should be taken back or 
purchased back for bidding, according to the law. The original land users should be allowed 
to develop the land by themselves, development entities should be allowed to purchase land 
for centralized development, and collective economic entities in rural areas should be allowed 
to organize the development of land. The significance of the new regulation is to tap unused 
land and ease the imbalance between supply and demand in the land market and the pressure 
of ‘land kings’. But this does not mean that we have come to an era in which transfer by 
agreement is abolished in the land transfer system, or the regulation that all land should be 
auctioned is loosened. Therefore, pressed by financial stresses, many local governments and 
land developers regard future urbanization as salvation, and are flooding the market with a 
large quantity of land, sparking a craze in the land market. As a result of intensive land 
utilization, 133 million m2 of land was sold in October, up 8% year on the year. This was 
followed by a huge rise in land supply and transactions in 20 Chinese cities, including Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. 
 On 28 November, the executive meeting of the State Council adopted the Land 
Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China (Amendment), which revises the 
compensation system for collectively owned land that is appropriated. This amendment only 
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raises the compensation for appropriated land, and does not cover any other reform. 
Unification of land prices and land rights is still unattainable. How much the compensation 
will be raised still remains a secret. Houses of limited property rights are still strictly 
forbidden.3 Such a practice will only further distort the land system and land market. Take 
houses of limited property rights for example. During the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), 
relevant authorities issued 14 regulations on houses of limited property rights, clearly 
stipulating that these houses are illegal, banning their sale, calling for the punishment of the 
people responsible and even the demolition of houses of limited property rights that are 
unsold. They also emphasized that urban residents should not buy them, because they are not 
protected by law. But according to a survey by All-China Federation of Industry and 
Commerce, during the 11th Five-Year-Plan period, 283 million m2 of houses of limited 
property rights were constructed across China, from the eastern to western areas, from 
suburbs to rural areas. There is also a wide variety of houses of limited property rights, 
ranging from roughcast houses to well-decorated small apartments, from sea-view villas to 
pastoral properties. Buyers are farmers deprived of farmland and urban residents who cannot 
afford to buy commercial residential houses, urban residents who want to enjoy a pastoral life 
in the countryside after retirement, and those that buy villas for investment purposes. As a 
matter of fact, such houses cannot be simply prohibited. Instead, we should increase the 
comparative returns of farming in line with the principle of unifying land prices and rights so 
that farmers will voluntarily protect farmland. Also, we should, according to the principle of 
unifying authority over administrative affairs and financial affairs, reform the existing 
financial system and solve the problem of limited revenue sources of local governments. On 
top of that, we should gradually deregulate houses of limited property rights by separating old 
houses from new ones. 
 
3. Doubling People’s Incomes 
The excess disparity between the rich and the poor and severe unfairness in income 
distribution is the major problem in China at present, which directly jeopardizes economic 
development and social stability. In theory and practice, the Gini coefficient is the benchmark 
for measuring income disparity. Zhao Renwei and Li Shi of the Institute of Economics of 
CASS were the first Chinese researchers to study the issue of income distribution. Based on 
three large household surveys, they calculated China’s Gini coefficient in 1988, 1995 and 
2002 to be 0.382, 0.452 and 0.46 respectively, indicating that the income disparity is 
widening. In 2000, the National Bureau of Statistics reported that China’s Gini coefficient 
                                                        
3 Houses with limited property rights are those built on collectively owned rural land but sold to buyers who 
are not part of the collective land ownership and therefore don’t have legal protection for property rights. 
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was 0.412, much lower than the figure released in 1995. After that, the National Bureau of 
Statistics never again released the coefficient.  
 On 9 December 2012, the Survey and Research Center for China Household Finance of 
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) unveiled the first 
‘non-governmental’ Gini coefficient for 2010, which stood at 0.61. To break it down, the 
coefficient was 0.56 for urban areas and 0.60 for rural areas. It was because of the wide 
disparity in income shown by the non-governmental Gini coefficient that the National Bureau 
of Statistics was forced to release the coefficient for the years 2003–2012. The coefficient 
was 0.491 in 2008, 0.477 in 2011 and 0.474 in 2012, which presented a trend of falling from 
the peak. However, the trend displayed by the figures differs from what people feel. 
Therefore, it was questioned by many Chinese and foreign experts. According to Zhao 
Renwei, ‘Urban and rural areas are combined to calculate the Gini coefficient in more than 
200 countries around the world. Only in China are they separated. This itself is something 
strange. Even if this basic problem can’t be solved, how can the disparity between the rich 
and the poor be narrowed?’ Li Jian thinks that this figure is extremely odd. Xu Xiaonian, of 
the China Europe International Business School, frankly said that ‘even children’s fairy tales 
can’t be written in this way’. Ding Anhua (vice president of China Merchants Securities (HK) 
Co., Ltd.), Li Wei (economic analyst of the Standard Chartered Bank), and Qu Hongbin 
(chief economist of HSBC Bank) think that there is no way to assess or compare this figure. 
Given the opinions of these experts, it is understandable that people are suspicious of the 
numbers. 
 To solve the acute problem of income distribution, the 18th CCP National Congress 
adopted the income doubling program and target, specifically stipulating that not only total 
GDP and per capita GDP, but also per capita income should be doubled. To do this, people’s 
incomes should be doubled on an inflation-adjusted basis, and disposable income doubled on 
a tax-adjusted basis. This is an encouraging target. But the key is how to achieve this target. 
The State Council once promised to unveil the income distribution reform plan by the end of 
2012. But to date, there is no information on it. This shows how difficult it is.  
 In the Q3 macroeconomic analysis, this issue was discussed from the perspectives of 
primary distribution and redistribution. There are two problems with the primary distribution. 
First, the income of businesses grows rapidly while that of employees rises very slowly. As a 
result, the proportion of income of businesses in disposable income grew from 15% in the 
1990s to the current 20%. The income of businesses grew too rapidly for two reasons. First, 
in the relationship between labour and management, labourers are usually weaker. Also, 
labour resources in China are abundant and the development-oriented government is in more 
favour of capital. Therefore, wages are relatively lower and the working conditions in 
factories are far from satisfactory. The second reason that the income of businesses grew too 
rapidly is that monopolistic departments take advantage of their monopoly to price their 
products much higher than the equilibrium price to gain excess profits. Also, they leverage 
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the administrative monopoly empowered by the government to lower their cost far below the 
normal cost to get monopoly rents. As to the second problem with primary distribution, the 
disparity in the wages of executives and ordinary employees is too wide. According to the 
information provided by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the disparity 
in 2011 was up to 4,553 times. This is mainly because of the lack of market restrictions and 
property rights constraints in SOEs. The remuneration of SOE executives has risen rapidly. In 
addition, the stock option system is quite distorted. Consequently, the huge disparity in the 
wages of executives and employees is not surprising. Government revenue is excessive and is 
growing too rapidly. In addition, income from moonlighting, rent seeking and corruption 
among government officials is a severe problem and difficult to deal with. To address the 
income distribution problem, we should find apt and specific ways, and take effective 
measures.  
 Based on the spirit of the 18th CCP National Congress, we would like to discuss this 
issue from another perspective. Although income distribution is an important reason for the 
disparity between the rich and the poor, wealth distribution rather than income distribution is 
decisive in reality. The two issues are connected but quite different. Income distribution refers 
to flow distribution or increment distribution. Wealth distribution refers to stock distribution. 
With stock wealth, income flow can be generated at any time. If the flow is used for 
investment, it will be transformed into stock. The flow or increment is relatively smaller, 
while the stock is larger. This is general knowledge. 
 Stock wealth consists of material property, financial property and intangible property. In 
reality, the disparity caused by direct acquisition of various property, property appreciation 
and deprecation is much larger than that caused by income distribution. For instance, in coal 
development in Shanxi and Shaanxi, the fight for exploration and mining rights turned out to 
be a hallmark event. Why could the coal tycoons from Zhejiang strike it rich overnight? Why 
did the Shanxi provincial government rip up the agreement with the excuse of industrial 
integration to snatch the mining rights from coal tycoons, which resulted in the advance of 
the state and the retreat of the private sector? The reason is that it can bring huge fortunes. 
Why do the relatives of government officials choose to work as executives of large SOEs? 
Because they can enjoy huge remuneration and get wealth through control of assets. Take 
financial assets, which include bank savings, stocks and bonds, as an example. At the end of 
last year, the balance of resident bank savings amounted to RMB 40 trillion. The value of 
these financial assets didn’t rise along with economic growth. Instead, it decreased due to the 
high interest margin and negative real interest rate. It is the financial sector that benefits from 
this. Most of the hundreds of billions of profit of state-owned banks comes in this way. Both 
savings and loans are actually donations to the banking sector. This is a hidden wealth 
transfer. 
 The wealth disparity resulting from this transfer overlaps with and differs from the 
foregoing analysis to some extent. First, the wealth transfer is caused by the division between 
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urban and rural areas. Before the reform kicked off, farmers were exploited by the ‘price 
scissors’ for a total of RMB 600 billion in 30 years. In recent years, trillions in wealth has 
been plundered from farmers whose land is appropriated every year. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
the price scissors provided a breeding ground for rent-seeking and corruption. In this century, 
the dual division system of land provides fertile soil for rent-seeking and corruption. Many 
rural residents work in urban areas, providing an inexpensive labour force and creating 
enormous wealth. However, they can’t enjoy the same services and benefits as their urban 
counterparts because of the household registration system. This exploitation of farmers 
results in low-cost urbanization. Second, the wealth transfer is caused by the public 
ownership system. In China, natural resources and SOEs are owned by the state and the 
capital gains from them should be enjoyed by all the people. In reality, however, some of 
them are transferred to private enterprises at low prices, some are controlled by a few 
officials, and some are even transferred into individual wealth by various legal and illegal 
means, leaving only the environmental costs. Third, the wealth transfer is caused by 
monopoly. This is mentioned in the report of the previous quarter. On 4 January, the Bureau 
of Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly of the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) imposed a penalty of RMB 353 million on Samsung, LG, Chimei, 
AUO, Chunghwa Picture Tubes and Hannstar Display Corp. for their monopoly in 2001-2006. 
This gives some satisfaction to the people. But when can anti-monopoly investigations be 
launched on domestic monopolistic enterprises? Although people look forward to it, they 
don’t place much hope in it. 
 Based on the above analysis, to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor and solve 
the problem of unfair income distribution, we may need to start with unfair wealth 
distribution and seek a temporary and permanent solution. Only in this way can we increase 
the size of the middle class and change the current nail-shaped income distribution structure 
into an olive-shaped one. 
 
4. ‘Build a Beautiful China’ Campaign 
The 18th CCP National Congress proposed to build a beautiful China. General Secretary Xi 
Jinping also mentioned that people wish to lead a better life, including living in a clean and 
comfortable environment. This indeed embraces the people’s common will. In fact, 
low-carbon economies, ecological protection and environmental beautification have already 
become a tide throughout the world. 
 To address the environmental problem we must solve the energy issue. As a new energy 
industry, the photovoltaic power industry is both a strategic highland for a new wave of 
international competition and an important means to build a beautiful China. 
 It is well known that energy is an important force that drives human development. Men 
were distinguished from animals the day they learned how to drill wood to make fire. To date, 
the production and utilization of fossil energy has significantly shaped the world. But what 
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will the future sources of energy be? We believe that photovoltaic power will become the 
major source of energy, because it has many advantages. Comparatively speaking, traditional 
fossil fuels will soon be used up, and they cause serious pollution. Nuclear power can provide 
a lot of power, but safety is a major concern. The Chernobyl nuclear power plant has changed 
a vast area of Ukraine into barren land. The earthquake in Japan demonstrated that the safety 
of nuclear power is hard to ensure, and it takes a long time for nuclear radiation and nuclear 
waste to decay. As long as water flows, it can generate hydraulic power. However, it poses a 
very negative ecological impact. The debate on the Three Gorges Dam and Power Plant is 
still going on today. Some people call it a sword hanging over the heads of the Chinese 
people. The cascade development on the upper reaches of the Yangtze River has caused a 
serious ecological impact. Wind power doesn’t cause any pollution. However, it is restricted 
to windy areas and it is not easy to manufacture and maintain the tall wind power towers. 
Solar power is inexhaustible and doesn’t cause any pollution. Moreover, it is easy to 
manufacture and install solar panels, which can be installed on roofs, walls, in empty space 
and deserts. Therefore, photovoltaic power is an important means to solve the future energy 
problem and build a beautiful China. 
 China’s photovoltaic power industry has undergone a leap forward in its growth. Take the 
Wuxi-based Suntech Power Company as an example. It was established in 2001 and put the 
first production line into operation in 2002, which could produce 10 megawatts (MW) of 
solar panels per year. Product capacity was expanded to 150 MW by 2005, 470 MW by 2007 
and 1,000 MW by 2010. In 2011, the company put the fourth production line into operation, 
increasing the production capacity to 2,400 MW per year. Devoting 5% of annual revenues to 
research and development (R&D), the company now has two R&D centres and five global 
production bases staffed with over 20,000 employees. But now, like China’s photovoltaic 
power industry, Suntech Power has also plunged into trouble.  
 The trouble has two root causes. One cause is the blind development dominated by the 
government. Spurred by policies issued by the central government, local governments vie 
with each other in setting up solar panel manufacturing facilities. Many enterprises in 
traditional industries, such as textile, clothing, home appliances and traditional power 
industries moved into the photovoltaic power industry, giving rise to production capacity 
surplus. In 2011, the global market capacity totalled 290 MW, but China’s production 
capacity exceeded 300 MW. The second cause is dramatic changes in the market. Some 
people say jokingly that China’s photovoltaic power industry is a baby born in China but 
raised by other countries, because 95% of the market is abroad and 70% of the demand 
comes from Europe and the US. However, both Europe and the US launched anti-dumping 
and anti-subsidy investigations into China’s solar panel manufacturers. In November 2012, 
the US made a final verdict to impose a high customs duty on solar panels imported from 
China. Now 95% of the polysilicon and 50% of the solar panel production capacity is shut 
down. Take Suntech Power as example again. It was listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
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(NYSE) at US$ 15 per share. The company raised US$ 197 million and its market value 
amounted to US$ 4.9 billion. The share price went up to US$ 92. But now its share price has 
dropped below US$ 1 and the market value of the company is only US$ 140 million. If this 
situation is not reversed within a given time, it will be delisted from the NYSE. In general, 
the cash flow of most solar panel manufacturers has dried up, plunging them into liquidity 
difficulties and crisis.   
 However, the photovoltaic power industry still has a rosy future. In terms of market 
prospects, international energy experts predict that the installed capacity of solar power 
generation will amount to 600 gigawatts (GW) in Europe and 900 GW in the US by 2050, 
and 1 terawatt in China by 2030, growing by more than 30 times in less than 20 years and 
presenting a bright market prospect. In terms of technological and economic prospects, the 
price of electricity generated by solar power was RMB 4 per kWh three years ago. Now, the 
price is approaching RMB 1 per kWh. Experts predict that by 2017-2019, the price of 
electricity generated by solar power can compete with the on-grid price of electricity 
generated by traditional energy sources. The price of solar power generation devices has also 
dropped rapidly. An inverter is a device that turns direct current into alternating current 
before the electricity is integrated into the power grid. In 2008, the cost was RMB 6-8/W, but 
now it is only RMB 0.4/W.  
 Many people advocate nationalization of the photovoltaic power industry so it can 
address the liquidity crisis haunting the industry, thinking that the four major state-owned 
power companies are powerful and have abundant funds. Actually, nationalization is being 
adopted in many places. For instance, Jiangxi-based LDK Power sold 19.9% of its shares to a 
company in Xinyu that is owned by the local State-owned Assets Supervision Administration 
Committee. A photovoltaic power company in Dongying sold 50% of its shares to the 
Dongying Municipal State-owned Assets Supervision Administration Committee. 
Nationalization is also an option for Suntech Power to solve its current problems. However, 
we don’t think that it is a good choice. First, the four major state-owned power companies are 
all engaged in solar power. But Suntech Power outperformed them all. This proves that they 
are less efficient. Second, the four major state-owned power companies are leaders in the area 
of traditional energy, where they are fairly well off. Therefore, they won’t look for a new 
business while they already have a good one. Third, nationalization will squeeze the 
development room of private businesses and the whole market economy. A better way is to 
phase out those that should be eliminated through market integration so that good enterprises 
can grow larger and stronger. 
 As a solution to get out of this difficulty, the Ministry of Science and Technology issued 
the second list of ‘China Gold-Sun Projects’ of 2012 on 11 December, whose installed 
capacity totals 2.83 GW, making the annual aggregated installed capacity 4.54 GW, in a bid 
to expand the domestic photovoltaic application market. On 19 December, the executive 
meeting of the State Council adopted policy measures to promote the sound development of 
 Chinese Economy and Reform after the 18th CCP National Congress	
 
15 
 
the photovoltaic industry, covering five aspects: (1) accelerate industrial restructuring and 
technological advance; (2) regulate the industrial development order; (3) actively explore the 
domestic photovoltaic application market; (4) improve supportive policies; and (5) leverage 
the market system, reduce government intervention and prohibit local protectionism. The 
State Council also decided that the central treasury should earmark RMB 13 billion for the 
year to subsidize and support photovoltaic application demonstration projects. However, 
current policies make it difficult for the photovoltaic power industry to extricate itself from 
its plight. First, these policies are designed to subsidize photovoltaic application at home. But 
the domestic market accounts for a very small proportion of the world’s total. Therefore, the 
deterioration of the industry can hardly be eased. Second, most subsidies end up in the 
pockets of power station operators, while power generator manufacturers don’t benefit from 
them. Third, the renewable energy electricity price subsidy is distributed by the State Grid 
Corporation. Many photovoltaic power stations can only receive the desulfurization cost, and 
some of them don’t receive any subsidy at all. According to the latest news, the subsidy was 
distributed only until April 2011. This subsidy method warrants further discussion. 
 First, it still subsidizes manufacturers rather than consumers. When manufacturers are 
subsidized, foreign countries can still launch anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations. 
Also, there is the problem of how to subsidize manufacturers. If all the manufacturers are 
subsidized, it will go against the adjustment principle, because those that should be phased 
out still exist and those that should be revitalized still remain sluggish. If the subsidy is given 
to selected manufacturers, the problem is how to select. Moreover, it will provide a good 
chance for the government to set and seek rent. This is demonstrated by the recent dispute 
between Himin and Sunrain Solar Energy over the subsidy for solar water heaters. 
Subsidizing consumers is a good method that complies with the requirements of the market 
economy. Consumers use the money to vote in the market (purchases). They will choose the 
better brand and vote for good manufacturers. In this way, better manufacturers will grow 
larger and stronger. Therefore, it is a good method for market selection. 
 Second, at present, the subsidy for solar power stations is called an application subsidy. 
But in fact, it subsidizes production. Even if the subsidy is received, only the manufacturers 
will benefit from it, while consumers can’t get any direct benefit. As a result, this is still a 
traditional practice that pays overdue attention to production and belittles consumption. Since 
solar panels can be installed on roofs and walls, why can’t we ‘walk on two legs’, i.e. build 
some large solar power stations while encouraging individuals and families to install solar 
panels through subsidies? Currently, the capacity of one m2 of solar panel is 150 W, and the 
cost is RMB 10-15/W. If the government subsidizes 70% of the cost, people only need to pay 
RMB 3-5/W. As a result, they will be willing to install solar panels. This is both consumption 
and investment. Solar panels can generate power once they are installed. If the problem of 
integrating power into the grid can be solved, people can sell the excess power they generate 
to the grid and buy power from the grid when the power they generate is insufficient. This is 
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real investment and consumers will be willing to install solar panels. In Germany, power 
generated by solar panels in family homes can be integrated into the grid. This proves that 
technology poses no obstacle. The problem lies in policies. If this problem is solved, the 
domestic photovoltaic market will be much larger than if only the power generators are 
supported. 
One issue is the power integration policy. When adopting the policy measure to regulate 
the industrial development order, the State Council emphasized that we should ‘better 
coordinate the planning of photovoltaic power industry and supportive grids, and particularly, 
establish a streamlined and efficient power integration service system’. On 26 October, the 
State Grid Corporation issued the Opinions on Intensifying the Integration Service for 
Distributed Power Generation (Interim). According to this document, from 1 November, 
distributed photovoltaic power generation projects in China can enjoy free integration service, 
use the power they generate and integrate spare power into the grid. But the China Southern 
Power Grid didn’t follow up. As a result, the document issued by the State Grid Corporation 
is only a ‘rubber check’, and photovoltaic power generators in China still suffer difficulty in 
integrating power into the grid and opening the domestic market. 
 A related issue is the power tariff policy. The executive meeting of the State Council also 
specified that ‘we should fix regional on-grid benchmark tariffs for photovoltaic power 
stations in line with resource conditions, subsidize photovoltaic power generators according 
to the quantity of power they generate, adjust the on-grid power tariff and subsidy standard 
according to cost changes, improve the mechanism to support the photovoltaic power 
industry with funds from the central treasury, and apply the same preferential value-added tax 
policy to photovoltaic power projects as to wind power projects’. On 4 December, NDRC and 
the State Electricity Regulatory Commission jointly issued a notice on the Proposal on 
Subsidy and Quota Trading for Power Tariffs of Renewable Energy (October 2010 – April 
2011), providing nearly RMB 10 billion in subsidies to 800 wind, solar, biomass and 
geothermal power generation projects. But these enterprises can’t access the subsidy quickly. 
Therefore, their cash flows won’t be sustained. Many of them are in difficulty and 
theoretically facing bankruptcy. 
 In general, if these problems are properly addressed, China’s photovoltaic power industry 
will grow significantly, and consequently the wish of building a beautiful China will 
gradually come true. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China marked the beginning of the 
third period of 30 years of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule, and it is of great importance 
for China’s future development. In the first three decades of its rule, the CCP established a 
planned economy, winding up in a blind alley. In the next three decades, China carried out 
marketization reforms, transitioning from a planned economy toward a market economy and 
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achieving high-speed economic growth. However, distortions in the economic system left 
China far from being a real market economy. In the coming period of 30 years, the CCP 
should adjust and perfect the economic system in favour of a market economy.   
In this brief, the main issues discussed are the following: First, China needs to mitigate 
pressures on the economic growth and strengthen structural adjustments. Second, China 
should break the urban-rural divide, solve land-related problems, and address conflicts of the 
household registration system (Hukou) and the related social welfare problems. This needs to 
be done in accordance with fair, constitutional principles, promoting a new type of 
urbanization. Third, China must attach more weight to solving the problems of unjust wealth 
distribution, reducing income disparities and doubling the income of the people. Fourth, 
China must develop new forms of energy, including photovoltaic solar energy, and improve 
the ecological environment in pursuit of the ‘build a beautiful China’ campaign. All of these 
tasks are going to be the important during this third period of 30 years of the CCP’s rule of 
China, and necessary in order to correct market distortions, perfect the market system, and 
ensure that the Chinese economy develops persistently and in a stable fashion. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
